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Abstract
A major goal of research on values has been to relate individual differences in value
priorities to differences in attitudes, behavior and background variables. Past research
most commonly adopted one of two approaches. Much research has selected a few
single target values whose priorities were postulated to associate with the attitude,
behavior and background variable of interest and then examined empirical relationships.
Other research has been more exploratory.It has related lists of values to various other
variables and then discussed the significant associations  that emerge. The focus on
relationships with single values make both these approaches insatisfying. My work
has sought to overcome those approaches.It has derived what may be a nearly
comprehensive set of different motivational types of values, recognized across cultures.
Each value type is represented by a number of single values that are combined to form
relatively reliable indexes of values priorities. Value systems can be treated as integrated
wholes in their relations with behaviors and, thereby, encourages researches to abandom
the prevailing single-values approaches.
Key words: Values. Behavior. Values Systems.
Resumen
Prioridad de Valores y Comportamiento: La Aplicación de una
Propuesta Teórica acerca de un Sistema Integrado de Valores
Uno de los objetivos centrales de las investigaciones sobre valores  ha sido el
estudio de las relaciones entre las diferencias individuales en actitudes, comportamientos
y marcos o contextos de referencia. Las investigaciones del pasado han adoptado uno
de los siguientes enfoques. Muchos estudios seleccionaron un conjunto  de  priridades
entre valores singulares las que se postularon en  asociocion con  variables específicas
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de interés (actitudes, comportamientos, contexto), y se examinaron las relaciones
empíricas existentes. Otras investigaciones han sido más exploratorias. Relacionaron
listas de valores con otras variables, discutiéndose luego las asociaciones significativas
halladas. El hecho de focalizarse en relaciones con valores singulares o específicos
hace que ambos tipos de enfoques resulten insatisfactorios. Mi trabajo personal ha
intentado superar estas dificultades. He podido verificar que cabe referirse a un conjunto
comprehensivo integrado por diferentes tipos de valores motivacionales, reconocidos
en marcos culturales diversos. Cada tipo de valor está representado por un número de
valores singulares que, combinados. conforman índices relativamente confiables de
prioridades.
Los sistemas de valores pueden ser analizados, en sus relaciones con los
comportamientos, en tanto totalidades o conjuntos, hecho que debe alentar  a que los
investigadores  dejen de lado los estudios centrados en valores aislados.
Palabras claves:  valores. Comportamientos. Sistemas de valores.
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A major goal of research on values has been to relate individual differences in value
priorities to differences in attitudes, behavior, and background variables.  Past research
most commonly adopted one of two approaches. Much research has selected a few
single target values whose priorities were postulated to associate with the attitude,
behavior, or background variable of interest and then examined empirical relationships
(e.g., obedience and social class—Alwin, 1984; world at peace and pacifism—Mayton
& Furnham, 1994; equality and civil rights—Rokeach, 1973).  Other research has been
more exploratory.  It has related lists of values to various other variables and then
discussed the significant associations that emerged (e.g., with personality inventories—
Furnham, 1984; with race, nationality, and age—Rokeach, 1973; with quality of teaching—
Greenstein, 1976).  The associations with single values that emerge can, of course,
almost always be interpreted as making sense, post hoc.
The focus on relationships with single values makes both these approaches
unsatisfying.  It leads to a piecemeal accumulation of bits of information about values
that is not conducive to the construction of coherent theories. Three noteworthy
problems beset these approaches.  First, the reliability of any single value is quite low.
Hence chance may play a substantial role in the emergence or nonemergence of
significant associations with single values. Second, absent a comprehensive set of
values or of a broad theory to guide selection of target values, values that were not
included in a study may be equally or more meaningfully related to the phenomenon in
question than those studied (e.g., the almost total absence of power values in the
literature on values and political orientations).
Third, and most important, these single-value approaches ignore the widely shared
assumption that attitudes and behavior are guided not by the priority given to a single
value but by tradeoffs among competing values that are implicated simultaneously in a
behavior or attitude (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992; Tetlock, 1986). Indeed, values may
play little role in behavior except when there is value conflict—when a behavior has
consequences promotive of one (or more) value but opposed to others that are also
cherished by the person. It is in the presence of conflict that values are likely to be activated,
to enter awareness, and to be used as guiding principles. In the absence of value
conflict, values may draw no attention. Instead, habitual, scripted responses may suffice.
My work has sought to overcome these three problems.  It has derived what may be
a nearly comprehensive set of different motivational types of values, recognized across
cultures.  Because the value set is nearly comprehensive, it is unlikely that important
types of values will be overlooked in analyses of the relations of values to other variables.
Each of these value types is represented by a number of single values that are combined
to form relatively reliable indexes of value priorities. Most importantly, the theory
conceptualizes the set of value types as an integrated system.  Consequently, the full
set of value priorities can be related to other variables in an organized, coherent manner
rather than in a piecemeal fashion.
This chapter illustrates how value systems can be treated as integrated wholes in
their relations with behavior and, thereby, encourages researchers to abandon the
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prevailing single-values approaches. For this purpose, it discusses three examples of
the relations of value priorities with a diverse set of behavioral variables: cooperative
behavior, voting in national elections, and readiness for contact with members of an
out-group.
Overview of Theory
Influenced heavily by Rokeach (1973) and Kluckhohn (1951), the theory defines
values as desirable, transsituational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding
principles in people’s lives (see Schwartz, 1992, for a fuller elaboration of the theory).
The crucial content aspect that distinguishes among values is the type of motivational
goal they express.  I derived a typology of the different contents of values by reasoning
that values represent, in the form of conscious goals, three universal requirements of
human existence: biological needs, requisites of coordinated social interaction, and
demands of group survival and functioning.  Groups and individuals represent these
requirements cognitively as specific values about which they communicate in order to
explain, coordinate, and rationalize behavior.
Ten motivationally distinct types of values were derived from the three universal
requirements. A conformity type was derived, for example, both from the prerequisite of
smooth interaction and of group survival—that individuals restrain impulses and inhibit
actions that might hurt others.  There is substantial, cross-cultural, support for the
distinctiveness of these ten types in research with samples from 41 countries (Schwartz,
1992, 1994; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995). Table 1.1 lists the value types, each defined in
terms of its central goal, and followed, in parentheses, by specific single values that
primarily represent it. A specific value represents a type when actions that express the
value or lead to its attainment promote the central goal of the type.
TABLE 1.1 Definitions of Motivational Types of Values in Terms of
Their Goals and the Single Values That Represent Them
POWER (PO): Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources. (Social
Power, Authority, Wealth) [Preserving my Public Image, Social Recognition]a
ACHIEVEMENT (AC): Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards.
(Successful, Capable, Ambitious, Influential)[Intelligent, Self-Respect]
HEDONISM (HE): Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself. (Pleasure, Enjoying Life)
STIMULATION (ST): Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life. (Daring, a Varied Life, an Exciting Life)
SELF-DIRECTION (SO): Independent thought and action-choosing, creating, exploring. (Creativity,
Freedom, Independent, Curious, Choosing own Goals) [Self-Respect]
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UNIVERSALISM (UN): Understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection for the welfare of all
people and for nature. (Broadminded, Wisdom, Social Justice, Equality, a World at Peace, a World of
Beauty, Unity with Nature, Protecting the Environment)
BENEVOLENCE (BE): Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in
frequent personal contact. (Helpful, Honest, Forgiving, Loyal, Responsible) [True Friendship, Mature Love]
TRADITION (TR): Respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture
or religion provide the self. (Humble, Accepting my Portion in Life, Devout, Respect for Tradition,
Moderate)
CONFORMITY (CO): Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and
violate social expectations or norms. (Politeness, Obedient, Self-Discipline, Honoring Parents and Elders)
SECURITY (SE): Safety, harmony and stability of society, of relationships, and of self. (Family Security,
National Security, Social Order, Clean, Reciprocation of Favors) [Sense of Belonging, Healthy]
Note. a. Values in brackets are not used in computing the standard indexes for value types because
their meanings are not consistent across samples and cultures (Schwartz, 1992, 1994). For example,
self-respect is found almost equally frequently with achievement and with achievement values.
Additional values included to measure a possible spirituality value type that was not found were: a
Spiritual Life, Meaning in Life, Inner Harmony, Detachment.
In addition to propositions regarding the content of values, the theory specifies
dynamic relations among the types of values. Actions taken in pursuit of each type of
values have psychological, practical, and social consequences that may conflict with
or may be compatible with the pursuit of other value types. The total pattern of relations
of value conflict and compatibility among value priorities gives rise to a circular structure
of value systems. This structure, has also received substantial support in cross-cultural
research (Schwartz, 1992, 1994; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995).1 Competing value types emanate
in opposing directions from the center; complementary types are in close proximity
going around the circle.
The nature of the compatibilities among value types is clarified by noting the shared
motivational orientations of the adjacent value types.  Viewed in terms of these shared
orientations, the adjacent types form a motivational continuum around the circular
value structure.
Power and achievement both emphasize social superiority and esteem.
Achievement and hedonism both express self-centeredness.
Hedonism and stimulation both entail a desire for affectively pleasant arousal.
1. The near universality of the structure of relations among value types indicates that the meaning
of each type is similar in the vast majority of samples.  However, the importance of the ten value
types varies substantially across samples.  It is the similarity of meaning that makes it possible to
interpret the differences in value importance.
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Stimulation and self-direction both involve intrinsic motivation for mastery and
openness to change.
Self-direction and universalism both express reliance upon one’s own judgment and
comfort with the diversity of existence.
Universalism and benevolence both entail concern for enhancement of other and
transcendence of selfish interests.
Benevolence and tradition/conformity all promote devotion to one’s in-group.
Tradition/conformity and security all emphasize conservation of order and harmony
in relations.
Security and power both stress avoiding or overcoming the threat of uncertainties
by controlling relationships and resources.
In contrast, the motivational goals of the value types in opposing positions around
the circle cannot easily be pursued at the same time.  For example, the pursuit of
achievement values may conflict with the pursuit of benevolence values: Seeking
personal success for oneself is likely to obstruct actions aimed at enhancing the welfare
of others who need one’s help.
Two major value conflicts that structure value systems have been found in
over 95% of samples I have studied in 41 countries (Schwartz, 1994). This enables
us to conceptualize the total structure of value systems as organized on two basic
dimensions. Each is a polar opposition between two higher order value types.
One dimension opposes Openness to Change (combining the self-direction and
stimulation value types) to Conservation (combining security, conformity, and tradition).
This dimension reflects a conflict between emphases on own independent thought and
action and favoring change versus submissive self-restriction, preservation of traditional
practices, and protection of stability. The second dimension opposes Self-Transcendence
(combining benevolence and universalism) to Self-Enhancement (combining power
and achievement). This dimension reflects a conflict between acceptance of others as
equals and concern for their welfare versus pursuit of one’s own relative success and
dominance over others. Hedonism shares elements of both Openness and Self-
Enhancement.
This view of value systems as integrated structures facilitates the generation of
systematic, coherent hypotheses regarding the relations of the full set of value priorities
to other variables (e.g., behaviors). It also facilitates interpretation of the observed
relations of sets of values to other variables in a comprehensive manner. Two statements
summarize the implications of the interrelatedness of value priorities for generating
hypotheses and interpreting findings:
1. Any outside variable tends to be associated similarly with value types that are
adjacent in the value structure.
2. Associations with any outside variable decrease monotonically as one moves
around the circular structure of value types in both directions from the most
positively associated value type to the least positively associated value type
(Schwartz, 1992).
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Statement one implies that the associations for value types that are adjacent in the
value structure may not differ significantly from one another, unless the sample size is
large. Statement two implies that order of these associations is, nonetheless, precisely
predicted. Although the order of the value types is set by the theory, it is not necessarily
the case that the types most and least positively associated with an outside variable are
those in exactly opposing positions in Fig.1.1. As illustrated in study three below, this is
because the specific characteristics of the behavior in question make particular motivational
goals more or less relevant to a decision. I now apply these ideas to explain behavior.
Interpersonal Cooperation
Single behaviors are influenced by a large variety of factors specific to the situation
in which they occur.  Hence it is difficult to predict single behaviors from a transsituational
variable like values. Nonetheless, it should be possible to relate value priorities
systematically to a single behavior if the setting is controlled in a manner that reduces
random variation and eliminates overwhelming situational influences. This allows
individual differences in motivation to have a major impact.  Liron Natan, Gary Bornstein,
and I chose cooperation in an experimental game as a likely behavioral variable (Natan,
1993). Such games are constructed to tap behaviors that express relatively pure
motivations straightforwardly.
Ninety Hebrew University students (45 male, 45 female), recruited for a decision-
making experiment, participated in small groups. They first completed a 56-item value
survey (Schwartz, 1992) in which they rated the importance of each value “as a guiding
principle in my life” on a 9-point scale ranging from 7 (of supreme importance) to 0 (not
important) to -1 (opposed to my values).  Indexes of the importance of each value type
were computed by averaging the importance ratings of the values representative of that
type (see Table 1.1).
Each participant then read that, for this task, he or she was paired with another
student from their group, whose identity was not revealed. Participants were each
given the matrix in Table 1.2, without the labels “cooperation, noncooperation,
competition, and individualism.” This matrix was adapted from games like the
decomposed prisoner’s dilemma in order to measure cooperation versus noncooperation
(Messick & McClintock, 1968; Pruit, 1967).
TABLE 1.2 Matrix of Allocation Choices in Cooperation Experiment
Cooperation Noncooperation
Allocation to: Competition Individualism
Self 2.5 SH 2.5 SH  3 SH
Member in own Group 2 SH 0 SH 1 SH
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Participants were asked to choose one of the three alternatives for allocating money
between self and a member of their group. They learned that each person would receive
the amount of money he or she allocated to self plus the amount their partner allocated
to him or her. The cooperative choice entailed taking 2.5 shekels (about $1) for self and
giving 2 shekels to the other. Compared to the other choices, this meant sacrificing a
little of what one could gain (not taking 3 shekels) and giving the maximum to the other.
The other two choices were both noncooperative, maximizing either one’s absolute
gain (individualism) or relative gain (competition).
In order to derive hypotheses, we consider the consequences of each allocation
option for attaining or expressing the motivational goal of each of the ten types of
values. In a task of allocating resources between self and other, the relevant value
dimension is Self-Enhancement (including power and achievement values) versus Self-
Transcendence (including benevolence and universalism values). Analyses of the fit
between the consequences of cooperative and noncooperative behavior and the goals
of the value types yields the following set of hypotheses:
1. The strongest predictor of failure to cooperate is the importance attributed by
the individual to power values. This value type emphasizes competitive
advantage.  Power values legitimize seeking to maximize own gain even at the
expense of others. Achievement values also predict noncooperation because
they promote self-interest as well. But they are a weaker predictor because obtaining
resources through noncooperation would probably be a weak source of social
admiration, the core goal of achievement, as defined in the values theory. Hedonism also
predicts noncooperation because cooperation would entail some self-sacrifice inimical
to hedonistic goals.
2. The strongest predictor of cooperation is the importance attributed by the
individual to benevolence value, with universalism second. The experimental
setting probably makes cooperation more an expression of conventional decency
and thoughtfulness than of basic commitment to social justice.  Thus it is more
relevant to the goals of benevolence than of universalism values. Conformity
also predicts cooperation because cooperation is the normative, conventional
behavior in society.
3. Self-direction, stimulation, security, and tradition are all less relevant to this
decision, so we expect correlations near zero for them.
These hypotheses can be viewed as predicting the correlations with cooperation
of ten separate value types—three negative correlations (hypothesis 1), three
positive (hypothesis 2), and four near zero (null hypothesis 3). If, however, the
structure of values is considered as an integrated whole, the predicted correlations
with cooperation form a systematic pattern that reflects the structure of dynamic
relations among the value types.
Specifically, the predicted pattern of correlations shows the two earlier noted
characteristics regarding the associations of the system of value priorities with any
outside variable: Cooperation is similarly related with value types that are adjacent in
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the value structure and its associations decrease monotonically as one moves around
the circular structure of value types in both directions from the most positively associated
value type (benevolence) to the least positively associated value type (power).
Unfolding the value structure circle yields an integrated prediction of values-
cooperation correlations with a sinusoidal shape. The observed point-biserial
correlations between cooperation (scored 0-1) and the importance attributed to each
value type are shown in Fig. 1.2.2 The hypotheses were largely confirmed. Benevolence
was most positively correlated and power most negatively.  More important, the order
of the correlations followed the order around the value circle from benevolence to
power. The fact that self-direction, stimulation, security, and tradition had correlations
near zero leads to more than merely accepting the null hypothesis in this context. It
conveys information about the systematic relationship of the whole system of values
to cooperation.
FIG. 1.2. Point-biserial correlations of value priorities with cooperation
versus noncooperation
2. Correlations are partialled for each person’s mean response to all 56 values, in order to control
for differential use of the response scale (see Schwartz, 1992).
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The six value types hypothesized to be relevant to cooperation in this setting had a
multiple correlation of .53 with the dichotomous behavioral variable.  They thus
accounted for 28% of its variance, a very respectable proportion for a single behavior.
Although the curve relating value priorities with cooperation is sinusoidal, it is
not symmetrical. For example, power is much more negatively related to cooperation
than is security, which is adjacent to it. This illustrates the fact that the theory of
value structure provides a baseline only for the order of associations.  More precise
hypotheses about differences in the absolute strength of associations require
analyses of the specific relevance of each value type to the behavior in question.
The brief explications of the hypotheses presented earlier suggested that power
is much more relevant to cooperation than is security.
Another view of the data further clarifies the joint impact of power and
benevolence—the two value types that were postulated to be most relevant to
cooperation, to have the strongest influence, and to operate in opposing directions.
We split the sample at the median on each of these value types and compared the
proportion who cooperated in the four subsamples formed by the 2 X 2 cross-
classification. Table 1.3 shows that cooperation was twice as frequent among those
who attributed high importance to benevolence and low importance to power values
(87%) than in any of the other subsamples (35%-43%). That is, a commitment to
values that promote cooperation (benevolence), in the absence of conflict with a
commitment to values opposed to cooperation (power), was necessary to elicit a
high level of cooperation.
TABLE 1.3 Proportion of Cooperation as a Function of the
Importance of Benevolence and Power Values
BENEVOLENCE
Low High
Low .43 .87
 (N = 14)  (N = 30)
POWER ___________________________________________________
High .35 .43
(N = 31) (N = 14)
The next example of how value systems relate, as integrated wholes, to behavior
takes us outside the laboratory to the study of voting behavior.  Voting is the outcome
of a complex of causes, one of which might be the person’s value priorities.
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Voting Behavior
Political psychologists and political scientists have often downgraded the importance
of value priorities as predictors of voting (e.g., Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes,
1960; see Sears, 1987). No doubt, other variables such as group membership, special
interests, and the character of the candidates are influential (Kinder & Sears, 1985).
But parties do convey broad ideological messages that are not entirely obscure
and confusing; and the public has some understanding of these messages
(Himmelweit, Humphreys, Jaeger, & Katz, 1981). Thus people can form an impression
of possible consequences of voting for one party rather than another for the
attainment of their values. By identifying the stands of parties on basic ideological
dimensions, it should therefore be possible to specify some systematic, predictive
relations of values to voting.
Students of politics (e.g., Himmelweit et al., 1981; Janda, 1980; Lipset & Rokkan,
1967; Seliger, 1975) have identified two major dimensions of political ideology on which
parties in various countries are differentiated. One dimension is concerned with issues
of civil liberties, law, and order, and the other with economic issues.  We refer to these
as classical liberalism and economic egalitarianism, respectively. In Israel, where this
study was conducted, the first dimension, classical liberalism, is critical for discriminating
among parties, the second of relatively little importance (Arian, 1989; Arian & Shamir,
1990). We therefore focus on the classical liberalism dimension.
On this dimension, parties differ in their emphases on individual freedoms, minority
rights, readiness for social change, and in their views on whether government should
give primacy to its role as the guardian of civil rights or as the protector of society
against the threat of deviant behavior from within or enemies from without. In
contemporary Israel, the problems of security and the Arab-Israeli conflict make this
dimension especially salient.
Relations between religion and state constitute a subdimension of liberalism in
Israel (Liebman & Don-Yehiya, 1984). Many religious citizens wish to ground all
aspects of public life in Israeli society in Jewish religious law.  Other citizens
oppose this religious conception of the Israeli state.  Ideologically, opposition to
the penetration of religion into civil law is based in commitment to individual
freedoms, hence the link to liberalism.  Support for religious penetration into the
state emphasizes conformity to religious norms in order to preserve a sacred social
order, even at the expense of individual freedoms—a nonliberal position.
Experts were asked to rate Israeli parties on each of the dimensions of political
ideology, as they presumably are seen by the public. Ratings of the parties differed
little on the economic egalitarianism dimension. They differed substantially on
both the classical liberalism and state/religion dimensions.  Moreover, ratings on
the latter two dimensions were very similar, as expected. Therefore, in our study of
values and voting, Marina Barnea and I focused on the liberalism dimension,
combining ratings of parties on the two related dimensions. This gave special
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emphasis to the parties’ ideological stances on freedom of expression for individual
ideas and life styles.
Column 1 of Table 1.4 orders eight Israeli political parties from the one rated
most liberal to the one rated least liberal.3  The religious parties rated lowest because
they favor imposing religious law, thereby limiting individual freedom in all domains
of life. Following each party name is the number of respondents in a representative
national survey done in 1990 who had voted for the party in the 1988 national elections.
TABLE 1.4 Order of Israeli Political Parties on Classical Liberalism
Ideology
According to According to Group
Judges’ Ratings Centroids on Value-Based
Discriminant Function 1
(1)  Mapam-Ratz (n = 55)            1.012 (1)
(2)  Shinui (n = 19)  .831 (2)
(3)  Labor (n = 248)  .381 (4)
(4)  T’hiya (n = 17)  .490 (3)
(5)  Likud (n = 310) -.103 (6)
(6)  Tsomet (n = 14) -.032 (5)
(7)  Moledet (n = 10) -.259 (7)
(8)  Religious (n = 94)           -1.482 (8)
In order to derive hypotheses, we consider the consequences of electing parties
with various stands on the liberalism dimension for attaining or expressing the
motivational goal of each of the ten types of values.  Because the parties are primarily
discriminated according to their views on freedom of individual expression versus
maintenance of order and control of “deviance,” the relevant value dimension for
predicting voting, as shown earlier in Fig. 1.1, is the Openness to Change (including
self-direction and stimulation) versus Conservation (tradition, conformity, security)
dimension of values.
3. Religious parties include four different religious parties.  Mapam-Ratz includes two parties with
similar platforms emphasizing civil liberties.  Parties that received fewer than 10 votes in our sample
were not included in the analyses.
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The associations with the importance attributed to tradition and to self-direction
values should be strongest, because the attainment of their core goals is most affected
by policy differences on individual freedoms versus order and control. The more a
party is seen as emphasizing order and control of deviance at the expense of individual
freedoms, the more likely are those for whom tradition values (humility, devoutness,
moderation, accepting ones portion in life, respect for tradition) are of great importance
and self-direction values (creativity, freedom, independence, choosing own goals,
curiosity) of little importance to vote for it.
Giving priority to conformity and to security values should also promote support
for parties that favor order and control, because both these value types emphasize
preservation of social order and maintenance of harmony in relations. Giving priority to
stimulation and hedonism values should promote support for parties that emphasize
freedom, because both value types stress the individual’s pursuit of pleasant arousal in
novel ways and according to personal preference. A concern for opportunities to pursue
social recognition for distinctive individual achievements may also lead those who give
priority to achievement values to support parties that emphasize freedom.
The remaining value types (benevolence, universalism, and power) are more relevant
to the economic egalitarianism dimension of political ideology on which Israeli parties
are not strongly discriminated. They are less relevant to the liberalism dimension. We
therefore did not anticipate that they would be related to party support in Israel.
As with the hypotheses for cooperation, the hypotheses for voting can be viewed
as predicting the relations of ten separate value types with behavior. Here too, however,
considering the structure of values as an integrated whole reveals that the hypothesized
relations with liberal voting preferences form a systematic pattern that reflects the
structure of dynamic relations among the value types (cf. Fig. 1.1). Associations with
the priority given to self-direction values are predicted to be most positive, and
associations with the other value types are hypothesized to be progressively less
positive as one moves in both directions around the circular structure of value types to
tradition, the most negatively associated value type.
The hypotheses were tested with data from a representative sample of the Jewish
population in Israel above age 19, who responded to a survey in their homes during the
summer of 1990. They first completed an abbreviated version of the value survey that
included 37, rather than the usual 56, single values selected to represent all ten value
types. The values representing benevolence and universalism did not separate
empirically in the multidimensional scaling analysis (SSA; Guttman, 1968) on these
data. They were therefore combined to form a single Self-Transcendence value type.4
Because both benevolence and universalism values were expected to have no association
4. This combination corresponds to a higher-order value type found almost universally with the
original 56 value survey (Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995).
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with voting, this combination posed no problem. At the end of the survey, respondents
indicated the party for which they voted in the most recent national elections (1988).
The 769 respondents who voted for parties with at least ten supporters in the sample
were included in the analyses.
Discriminant function analysis was used to assess the associations of values with
voting.  We derived the functions that discriminate significantly among supporters of
the eight political parties, using the nine value types as discriminant variables. Two
significant discriminant functions were found. The first accounted for 74% of the common
variance, the second only for 21%.
As noted earlier, the prevailing view of Israeli politics assumes that the liberalism
(freedom of expression) ideological dimension is paramount. Hence, if values are relevant
to voting, one would expect the first, value-based function to tap variation among
parties essentially on this dimension. To establish if this was so, we examined the
ordering of the parties on the group centroids of the first function. We compared the
order of the parties on these centroids (Table 1.3, col. 2) with their order on the liberalism
dimension based on the a priori, judges’ ratings (Table 1.3, col. 1). As shown in the
table, the centroids ordered the groups in almost exactly the same order as the judges’
ratings (Spearman rank correlation .95). Thus this value-based function ordered the
parties on their perceived policies toward classical liberalism.5
Because the first function can be interpreted as representing party differences on
liberalism ideology, we can test the hypotheses for the specific value types by examining
the associations of each value type with this function. We ask, do the value types
hypothesized to promote support for parties committed to individual freedoms associate
positively with the function? And, do value types hypothesized to promote support for
parties that emphasize order and control associate negatively?  And, is the order of
associations of the nine value types the same as the order predicted from the integrated
structure of value relations?
The most accurate measures of the association of discriminant variables (here,
value types) with functions are the total structure coefficients (Klecka, 1980). For each
value type, the total structure coefficient, indicating its association with function 1, is
indicated on the graph in Fig. 1.3.
5. The much weaker second function was largely unipolar and defined mainly by positive associa-
tions with achievement, security, conformity, and power values.  The group centroids for this
function were unrelated to any of the judges’ ratings, suggesting no clear ideological interpretation of
this weak function.
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FIG. 1.3. Total structure coefficients for the association of value priorities
with function 1 for discriminating among party voters
The four value types hypothesized to associate positively (self-direction, stimulation,
hedonism, achievement), and two of the three types hypothesized to associate
negatively (tradition, conformity, but not security) with classical liberalism showed
significant associations (p < .01) in the predicted direction. No significant associations
emerged for the value types for which none was expected (power and self-transcendence
[benevolence plus universalism]).
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Most important, as shown by the sinusoid curve, the order of coefficients was
almost exactly as predicted by the integrated hypothesis for the whole structure of
values (small reversal for Stimulation/Hedonism): Self-direction was most positive, with
the coefficients progressively less positive as one moves around the structural circle
(Fig. 1.1) in both directions toward power.6
The relationship between value priorities and party voting is also revealed in the
comparison of individuals who voted for the two most extreme groups on the liberalism
dimension—Mapam-Ratz and Religious. The mean ratings of the importance of value
types for these individuals, as well as for supporters of the two major parties, are shown
in Table 1.5.
Self-direction, stimulation, and hedonism values were rated more important by
supporters of Mapam-Ratz (high liberalism) than by voters for the Religious parties
(low liberalism). Tradition and conformity values were rated more important by voters
for the Religious parties. Voters for the two major parties attributed intermediate levels
of importance to these value types. For these five types, differences between the extreme
groups all exceeded .75 standard deviations (p < .0001). For the remaining types,
differences were smaller and less systematically related to the order of the parties on
classical liberalism. In keeping with the integrated hypothesis, the size and sign of the
differences between the extreme groups followed the order of the value types around
the structural circle with a deviation of only one place for stimulation.
TABLE 1.5 Mean Ratings of the Importance of Value Types as a
Function of Political Party Preference
Value Types
Party SD  ST HE AC PO SE TR CO SET
Mapam-Ratz 5.25 4.25 4.59 4.04 2.80 4.83 2.45 3.92 5.15
Labor 4.84 4.09 4.42 4.51 3.46 5.62 3.30 4.73 5.13
Likud       4.51 4.12 4.29 4.71 3.64 5.65 3.87 4.87 4.97
Religious   3.90 3.22 3.21 3.66 3.1 5.48 5.49 5.05 5.08
Difference 1.35* 1.03* 1.38* .38 -.32 -.65 -3.04* -1.13*  .07
MR - Relig
Note *p < .01 SD = Self-direction   AC = Achievement    TR = Tradition ST = Stimulation
PO = Power CO=Conformity HE = Hedonism   SE = Security
SET=Universalism & Benevolence
6. The security situation in Israel probably led to the absence of an association for security.
Regardless of party preference, respondents rated security values much more important than is
common across nations (unpublished data).
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Overall, the findings supported the hypothesized relationships between value
priorities and party voting.  Using the value-based discriminant functions to classify
voters as supporters of one of the eight political parties yielded 51% correct
classifications.  As calculated by Goodman and Kruskal’s Tau, knowledge of individuals’
value priorities permitted a 32% improvement compared with chance classification
(Z = 10.24, p < .01). Finally, the order of associations supported our argument that
value systems relate as integrated wholes to other variables.
Readiness for Outgroup Social Contact
The final study examines how the value priorities of individuals help to explain their
readiness for social contact with members of an outgroup.  Rokeach (1973) reported the
only study I know that directly related to this topic. He found that 21 of the 36 single
values in his value lists were significantly associated with an index that included both
readiness for social contact and attitudes toward Blacks.  In his post hoc discussion,
Rokeach portrayed his findings as consistent with descriptions of prejudiced people,
but he offered no framework to organize them. The theory of value contents and structure
can be used to develop an integrated set of hypotheses to relate the comprehensive
system of value priorities to readiness for outgroup contact.
Lilach Sagiv and I applied the theory to study the readiness of Israeli Jews and
Israeli Arabs for social contact with one another (Sagiv & Schwartz, 1995). Because
the meaning of contact is different for dominant and minority groups, it is important
to note that Jews are the dominant group in Israel and Arabs are a minority. Members
of dominant groups are likely to understand contact as entailing acceptance of
minority group members as fully privileged members of their society. In contrast,
members of minority groups are likely to understand broad social contact as implying
their own integration into the larger society, or even their assimilation. These
different consequences of contact imply different relations with values. I discuss
only the dominant group here.
In order to generate hypotheses, we considered the consequences of contact with
members of the Arab minority group for the attainment or expression of the motivational
goals of the value types by members of the dominant Jewish group. This suggested the
following hypotheses:
1. Attributing importance to all three Conservation value types (tradition,
conformity, security) correlates negatively with readiness for out-group
contact. The most negative correlation is for tradition values because contact
entails exposure to divergent traditions and customs, threatening those for
whom maintenance of own traditions is important. Moreover, tradition values
correlate highly with religiosity (particular among Israeli Jews: Schwartz &
Huismans, 1995), and religiosity is related to ethnocentrism (see Wulff, 1991).
The negative correlation for conformity values is because contact with
culturally different minorities places one in situations where familiar norms
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do not apply, making it difficult to maintain smooth relations and to avoid
violating expectations. The negative correlation for security values is because
outgroup members may disrupt the prevailing social order, especially if
they feel oppressed and demand change.
2. Attributing importance to both Openness to Change value types (self-
direction and stimulation) correlates positively with readiness for outgroup
contact. The positive correlation for self-direction values is strong because
intergroup contact provides exposure to new and different ways of life and
opportunities to learn about and explore them. Moreover, people who
emphasize self-direction values are more likely to reject negative stereotypes
of outgroups because they prefer to make independent judgments based
on their own experience. A positive correlation is expected for stimulation
values because contact with outgroups provides opportunities for novelty
and excitement. But, in the context of conflict between Jews and Arabs, the
correlation should be weakened because outgroup contact may threaten
another goal of stimulation values—enjoyable arousal.
3. Attributing importance to both Self-Transcendence value types
(benevolence and universalism) correlates positively with readiness for
contact. The most positive correlation among all ten value types is for
universalism values because they emphasize understanding, accepting, and
showing concern for the welfare of all human beings. This value type, with its
goal of tolerance and acceptance even of those with different ideas and life
styles, is most relevant to outgroup contact. A positive correlation is expected
for benevolence values because they also emphasize concern for others. But
benevolence values are mainly expressed in everyday relations with close others,
not with outgroups. This should weaken the correlation, especially because the
Jewish-Arab conflict makes group boundaries salient.
4. We expected correlations near zero for the Self-Enhancement value types (power
and achievement) and for hedonism. Social contact is relevant to power values
both positively and negatively. Contact may provide members of a dominant
group opportunities to exercise power and experience superiority over
minorities of inferior status. But accepting minorities into society may
endanger the current dominance hierarchy, especially if the minority is
struggling to gain status.  The correlation will depend on the relative strength
of these opposing processes. If they are balanced, it may be near zero.
Social contact with Arabs is not especially relevant to attaining the goals of
achievement values, hence no correlation is expected. This is because, in
Israel, the Arab minority has little impact in the occupational and educational
arenas where members of dominant group compete for success and
recognition (Chemansky, Guvran, & Hmaisi, 1984; Graham-Brown, 1984).
Because outgroup contact is not relevant to the goals of hedonism, no
correlation is expected.
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When the findings reported by Rokeach (1973) are classified according to our
value types, the directions of the correlations are compatible with these hypotheses,
with the exception of hedonism. This set of hypotheses also forms an integrated
whole that reflects the structure of relations among value types. The predicted
correlations are progressively less positive as one moves in both directions around
the circle from universalism (most positive) to tradition (most negative) values.
The order of associations implied by the set of hypotheses forms the usual sinusoid
curve, but this curve is not symmetrical. For example, an especially sharp drop in
correlations is expected from universalism to benevolence, despite the fact that these
are adjacent types in the structural circle. This reflects the special relevance to the
behavior of outgroup social contact of tolerance for all (universalism) in contrast to
concern for one’s ingroup (benevolence).
The types predicted to have the most and the least positive associations with
readiness for outgroup social contact are not located in polar opposition in the
theoretical structure of value relations. This reflects the most critical motivational
issue related to this behavior in this setting—tolerance versus intolerance. On
this issue, universalism and tradition are the most opposed. The prototypical
opposition of universalism is with power. The issue central to this opposition, protecting
the interests of others (universalism) versus exploiting them for personal advantage
(power), is less critically relevant here.
Jewish public school teachers (n = 151), in Grades 6 through 10, from schools
around the country, provided the data to test these hypotheses. They first completed
the 56-item value survey.  Subsequently, they indicated their readiness, on a 5-point
willingness scale, for 7 types of contact with Israeli Arabs: (1) occasional superficial
social contact; (2) business or trade relations; (3) living in the same neighborhood; (4)
inviting as a guest to your home; (5) having as a close friend; (6) having as a next-door
neighbor; (7) having your children play together. Responses to these items were summed
to form an overall index (alpha = .95).
The correlations between value priorities and readiness for social contact are
shown in Fig. 1.4.7 The types of values hypothesized to have negative correlations
(tradition, conformity, security), and those hypothesized to have positive
correlations (universalism and self-direction), were correlated as expected (p < .01). The
correlations for the two types hypothesized to have weaker positive correlations
(benevolence and stimulation) were in the expected direction, but not reliably
different from zero. Finally, as hypothesized, the correlation for universalism was
most positive and that for tradition most negative.
7. Differential use of the response scale for ails was controlled by standardizing value ratings within
individuals.
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FIG. 1.4. Correlations of the value priorities of Israeli Jewish teachers
with their readiness for social contact with Israeli Arabs
The order of correlations matched that specified by the integrated hypothesis, as
described by a sinusoid curve, with only a slight deviation for achievement.  As expected,
given their order in the integrated hypothesis, the correlations for power, achievement,
and hedonism were close to zero. Together, the seven value types hypothesized to
affect readiness for outgroup social contact explained a substantial 39% of the variance
in the readiness of Israeli Jewish teachers for contact with Arabs.
Another way to look at these data is to consider the combined effects on readiness
for outgroup social contact of the two value types hypothesized to be most relevant
and most in conflict in this setting—universalism and tradition. for this purpose, we
split the sample at the median on each of these value types. We then compared the
readiness for contact of the four subsamples formed by the 2 (universalism: high/low)
X 2 (tradition: high/low) cross-classification. The two-way analysis of variance yielded
significant main effects for universalism and tradition (F (1,130df) = 21.57 and 15.65,
respectively, p <.001), but no interaction.  Table 1.6 shows the means for the four
subsamples.
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TABLE 1.6 Mean Readiness of Israeli Jews for Outgroup Contact
With Israeli Arabs as a Function of the Importance of
Universalism and Tradition Values
TRADITION
L o w H i g h
Low 3.01a 2.31
 (N = 34)  (N = 37)
UNIVERSALISM ___________________________________________
High 3.98 2.94
(N = 34) (N = 32)
Note. a. Response scale: 1 = Not at all willing;  5 = Definitely willing
The high universalism-low tradition subsample exhibited substantially more
readiness for outgroup contact than the low universalism-high tradition subsample (M
= 3.98 vs. 2.31). The other two subsamples, whose members were expected to experience
value conflict in the face of outgroup contact, showed intermediate levels of readiness.
Whereas universalism and tradition values are strongly opposed with regard to the
motivation of critical relevance in this setting, they are relatively independent with
regard to the broader motivations they express, as described in Table 1.1 and illustrated
graphically in Fig. 1.1. This independence is reflected in the almost equal numbers of
respondents found in each of the four subsamples in Table 1.6.
Here, I cannot fully discuss the hypotheses and results of parallel studies of the
readiness of Christian Arab and Muslim Arab minority groups for social contact with
Jews. However, two aspects of these studies are worth mentioning because they highlight
points that are crucial when relating value systems to behavior.  First, four of the nine
hypotheses that we generated for the minority groups differed from those generated for
the Jewish group. Second, the set of hypotheses for the minority groups did not follow
the usual order around the value circle.
These differences point to the necessity of analyzing the specific context in which
values are expressed or pursued in order to make sense of value-behavior relations. The
differences in the hypotheses reflected the different significance of contact for minority
and dominant groups, as integration or as assimilation into the larger society, or as
acceptance of minorities as full citizens. Clearly, the different meanings of social contact
affect its implications for value expression. Moreover, the deviations of the pattern of
predicted correlations suggest that the sociopolitical context of Arab minorities in
Israel has modified the usual reinforcement contingencies that link individual value
attainment to action in social life.  When the order of associations does not correspond
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to the order implied by the theory of the structure of value relations, it is likely that the
“psycho-logic” of conflicts and compatibilities among values is being distorted by
externally imposed social constraints.
For example, for the Israeli Muslim Arab minority, in contrast to the dominant Jewish
group, outgroup social contact is relevant to the goal of achievement values—success
according to prevailing social standards. The arena for most social achievement in
Israel, even for minority group members, is the larger societal world of work in which
contact with outgroup members is required. Although minority group members might
wish to pursue economic or academic success within their ingroup, there are few
opportunities to do so. There is no separate Israeli Arab economy and no Arab university.
Hence, in order to demonstrate high levels of competence and success, Arabs are
almost entirely constrained to obtain higher economic and educational positions by
active immersion in the institutions of the larger society (Smooha, 1984).
The foregoing analysis led to the hypothesis that an emphasis on achievement
values correlates positively with readiness for outgroup contact among Israeli Muslim
Arabs. The combination of this hypothesis with an hypothesized positive correlation
for benevolence values violates the order of associations implied by the prototypical
structure of value relations. Yet, both these hypotheses were confirmed. This observed
pattern of associations reflects the unusual organization of social reinforcements to
which a weak minority group that seeks to preserve its uniqueness is exposed.
Conclusions
This chapter began by identifying three problems in past research on the relations
of values to other variables: (1) use of unreliable single-item indexes of value importance;
(2) use of value lists that fail to cover the full range of motivations expressed in values
that are likely to influence behavior; (3) failure to view value systems as integrated
wholes with coherent relations to other variables that entail tradeoffs among competing
value priorities. I conclude by summarizing the responses to these problems that are
provided by the current approach.
The three studies discussed here demonstrate that using priorities for value types
rather for than single values permits consistent, theory-based prediction of behavior.
When the analyses reported here for the indexes of value types are performed with
single values, a much less lucid picture emerges in each study. Of course, many single
values do show significant associations with behavior in the directions hypothesized
for the value types they represent. However, exactly the pattern expected with unreliable
indicators is observed: nonsignificant associations in the predicted as well as the reverse
direction for single values from these same types, and a few significant associations for
single values from types expected to be unrelated to the behavior.
The same could be demonstrated for the relations of values with attitudinal variables
(e.g., environmental attitudes—Grunert & Juhl, 1991) and with background variables
(e.g., age—Schwartz, 1992). This gain over single values reflects two advantages of the
Value Priorities and Behavior: Applying a Theory of Integrated Value Systems
141
indexes of value types.  First, as multiple-item indicators, they are more reliable than
single values. Second, as sets of value items that share a core of meaning across
individuals and cultures, their shared variance is a more valid measure of specifiable
motivational goals. In contrast, single values are likely to have idiosyncratic meanings.
Use of the full set of value types also offers considerable—though not complete—
protection against the second problem identified, overlooking values that are important for
understanding behaviors or attitudes of interest. When researchers in various countries
added values that they judged to be missing from the survey, these values emerged
empirically as exemplars of the existing value types (Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995). It may well be
useful to add values of special relevance when studying a particular topic, but the ten
value types probably cover most, if not all, the broad types of motivation that are relevant.
Popular instruments currently used to study values, attitudes, and behavior are
considerably more problematic. It is possible to form indexes for value types from the
items in the Rokeach survey, for example (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987). These indexes are
less well-defined, however, and the coverage is less broad because power and tradition
values are omitted. The List of Values (Kahle, 1983) uses single items to measure nine
values, and it omits universalism, tradition, and conformity values.8  These are important
types to miss, as evidenced by their substantial relations to behavior in the studies
discussed here.
With regard to the third problem, conceptualizing value types as forming a structure
that relates as an integrated whole to other variables promotes systematic theory building
and testing rather than ad hoc interpretation. The first step required is a close analysis
of the consequences of a behavior or attitude for the expression or attainment of the
motivational goals of the value types, leading to the identification of the most relevant
type. Once this is done, the structure of value types facilitates the generation of
hypotheses for the remaining types. With such an approach, the relative sizes of
associations of the types are informative, not only their statistical significance. Indeed,
even near zero associations provide meaningful evidence regarding the systematic
nature of relations of values with an attitude or behavior, because they help to corroborate
the coherent pattern of associations with the whole structure of values.
The data reported in all three examples in the current chapter largely followed the
sinusoid curves implied by the structure of value systems. True sine curve patterns
were not found, however, nor should they be expected. As noted, the specific relevance
(e.g., power in the cooperation study) or irrelevance (e.g., hedonism in the outgroup
contact study) of each value type to the behavior in question is likely to produce
asymmetries in the curve. The order of associations is ordinarily, preserved, however. If
it is not, as with the Israeli Muslim Arabs in the outgroup contact study, distortions in
the patterns of reinforcement typical of human social relations should be sought.
8. Another problem with the List of Values (LOV) is that 5 of its 9 items are values with cross-
culturally inconsistent meanings (Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995).  A test of the validity of the LOV in five
economically advanced nations rejected the cross-cultural comparability of its items (Grunert, Grunert,
& Kristensen, in press).
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Finally, viewing value types as an integrated system fits the conception that
attitudes and behavior are guided by tradeoffs among relevant competing values
(Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992; Tetlock, 1986). The set of hypotheses typically
predicts both positive and negative associations, because the structure of relations
among value types is based on oppositions between motivational goals that tend
to be mutually exclusive. This chapter calls upon researchers into behavior and
attitudes to take competition between the relatively enduring systems of
individuals’ value priorities into account. The promise of this approach has been
described here.  It should now face the test of extensive research and the inevitable
corrections that will bring.
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